MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT April 26, 2023 (2024)

Preview
FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/26/2023 02:47 PM INDEX NO. 153070/2023NYSCEF DOC. NO. 16 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/26/2023 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF NEW YORK ------------------------------------------------------------------------ X MCCOY MCWASHINGTON, : Index No.: 153070/2023 Plaintiff, : Motion Sequence # -against- : HYATT CORPORATION and AGODA INTERNATIONAL : USA, LLC : Defendants. : ------------------------------------------------------------------------ X MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF HYATT’S MOTION TO DISMISS WILSON ELSER MOSKOWITZ EDELMAN & DICKER LLP Attorneys for Defendant HYATT CORPORATION 150 East 42nd Street New York, New York 10017 212-915-5101 File No.: 16893.00079 Submitted by: Jordan Meisner, Esq. 1 of 14FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/26/2023 02:47 PM INDEX NO. 153070/2023NYSCEF DOC. NO. 16 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/26/2023 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This Memorandum of Law is respectfully submitted in support of the motion by Defendant, HYATT CORPORATION (“HYATT”), by its attorneys, WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ, EDELMAN & DICKER, LLP, respectfully submits this Memorandum of Law in support of Hyatt Corp.’s motion for an Order: a) Pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(8) dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint as against HYATT for lack of personal jurisdiction and granting such other and further relief that this Court deems just and proper. NATURE OF ACTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Plaintiff, MCCOY MCWASHINGTON (“Plaintiff”) commenced this lawsuit against HYATT and AGODA INTERNATIONAL USA, LLC (“AGODA”) as a result of personal injuries he allegedly sustained on April 7, 2021 at the premises known as Secrets the Vine Cancun "Secrets" Resort, located at Boulevard Kukulcan KM, 14.5 Retorno De; Rey Lote, 38+38-b, 77500 Cancun, QR, Mexico (“The Vine”). 1 Plaintiff alleges that on or about Apri17, 2021, at approximately 5:00 p.m., while lawfully at The Vine, he was caused to slip and fall in the shower of his guest room, as a result of a defective/unsecured drain on the shower floor, resulting in injuries due to the dangerous, defective, hazardous, and unsafe condition on the interior of the subject premises, particularly the shower floor/ drain area within his guest room. 2 Plaintiff alleges that, on the 7th day of April, 2021, HYATT was responsible for maintaining the interior premises, specifically the shower, including the shower floor and drain, within the resort room where Plaintiff was a guest/invitee at the Secrets the Vine Cancun "Secrets" 1 See, Exhibit “A” 2 See, Exhibit “A” at Pg. 5, ¶18 2 of 14FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/26/2023 02:47 PM INDEX NO. 153070/2023NYSCEF DOC. NO. 16 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/26/2023 Resort, located at Boulevard Kukulcan KM, 14.5 Retorno De; Rey Lote, 38+38-b, 77500 Cancun, QR, Mexico.3 Plaintiff contends that, on April 7, 2021, HYATT owned, operated, maintained, and controlled the premises known as Secrets the Vine Cancun "Secrets" Resort, located at Boulevard Kukulcan KM, 14.5 Retorno De; Rey Lote, 38+38-b, 77500 Cancun, QR, Mexico .4 Plaintiff also alleges that, on April 7, 2021, HYATT was responsible for maintaining the interior premises, specifically the shower, including the shower floor and drain, within the resort room where Plaintiff was a guest/invitee at the Secrets the Vine Cancun "Secrets" Resort, located at Boulevard Kukulcan KM, 14.5 Retorno De; Rey Lote, 38+38-b, 77500 Cancun, QR, Mexico. 5 Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s misguided belief and mistaken claims to the contrary, on April 7, 2021, HYATT did not own, operate, manage and/or control the Secrets the Vine Cancun "Secrets" Resort. On April 7, 2021, on April 7, 2021, HYATT had no connection to the Secrets the Vine Cancun "Secrets" Resort whatsoever. 6 Plaintiff is attempting to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of New York over nonresident defendant HYATT, which is not a New York domicile and where the cause of action does not arise from HYATT’s limited contacts with the state of New York. At the outset, it should be noted that Plaintiff’s claim that HYATT is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of New York is simply not true. Moreover, the assertions in Plaintiff’s Complaint alleging inter alia, that HYATT is a foreign corporation transacting and/or conducting and/or doing and/or soliciting business within 3 See, Exhibit “A” at Pg. 3, ¶10 4 See, Exhibit “A” at Pg. 3, ¶6 5 See, Exhibit “A” at Pg.3,¶10 6 See, Urbanski Affidavit at ¶6 3 of 14FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/26/2023 02:47 PM INDEX NO. 153070/2023NYSCEF DOC. NO. 16 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/26/2023 the State of New York are irrelevant allegations for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction over HYATT for purposes of this action. The Vine is located at Boulevard Kukulcan KM, 14.5 Retorno De; Rey Lote, 38+38-b, 77500 Cancun, QR, Mexico. HYATT does have any operational responsibility or direct ownership of The Vine. On April 7, 2021 HYATT did not have any operational responsibility or direct ownership of The Vine. HYATT is therefore an improperly named party to this lawsuit. Furthermore, there is no evidence to support any connection between HYATT and the State of New York for the purposes of establishing general or specific personal jurisdiction relative to this lawsuit. Plaintiff does not have any basis to assert personal jurisdiction over HYATT under New York’s long-arm statutes. HYATT is not subject to general jurisdiction in New York as Hyatt is not “at home” in New York. HYAT was incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware 7 and maintains its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. 8 Since the accident in question occurred in Cancun, Mexico and not in the state of New York and does not involve HYATT’s limited activities in the State of New York, there is simply no basis in fact or law that would justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over HYATT in this action. Therefore, in light of the foregoing, HYATT respectfully requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint as against HYATT pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(8) on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. 7 See, Exhibits “B” and “C” 8 See, Exhibit “D” and Urbanski Affidavit at ¶1-2 4 of 14FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/26/2023 02:47 PM INDEX NO. 153070/2023NYSCEF DOC. NO. 16 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/26/2023 STANDARD ON A MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION CPLR §3211(a)(8) provides that a party may move for judgment dismissing causes of action against him or her where the court has not jurisdiction of the person of the defendant. See US Bank N.A. v McGown, 200 AD3d 826 (2d Dept 2021). On a motion pursuant to CPLR §3211(a) (8) to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the party asserting jurisdiction has the burden of demonstrating "satisfaction of statutory and due process prerequisites. See Matter of James v iFinex Inc., 185 AD3d 22 (1st Dept 2020) citing Stewart v Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 81 NY2d 203 (1993). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR §3211 (a) (8), the plaintiff has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence, through affidavits and relevant documents, to demonstrate jurisdiction. See Coast to Coast Energy, Inc. v Gasarch, 149 AD3d 485 (1st Dept 2017) citing Fischbarg v Doucet, 9 NY3d 375 (2007); Copp v Ramirez, 62 AD3d 23 (1st Dept 2009). LEGAL STANDARD FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION The U.S. Supreme Court has identified only two circ*mstances under which courts may assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant consistent with due process. First, a court located in a particular state may exercise “general jurisdiction” over a defendant if that defendant’s affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum state. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); Aybar v. Aybar, 37 N.Y.3d 274 (2021). Where a Defendant is not at home in the forum state, a Plaintiff must establish specific jurisdiction by showing an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy. See 5 of 14FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/26/2023 02:47 PM INDEX NO. 153070/2023NYSCEF DOC. NO. 16 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/26/2023 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); Aybar v. Aybar, 37 N.Y.3d 274 (2021). Notably, the nonmoving party cannot defeat the motion by relying on the mere allegations in his pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible. See Cortlandt St. Recovery Corp. v. Bonderman, 2021 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5622, *27 (Sup. Ct., NY Co. Nov. 10, 2021) (holding that plaintiff failed to provide a basis for long-arm jurisdiction where plaintiff "has offered nothing but conclusory assertions”). Here, in the present case, Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of jurisdiction over HYATT given that HYATT has presented a prima facie case that New York lacks jurisdiction over it. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v McMahon, 175 A.D.3d 1201, 1202 (1st Dep’t 2019) (granting trustee’s motion for summary judgment because “[t]he trustee made a prima facie case that New York lacked jurisdiction over him, and plaintiff failed to meet its burden to present sufficient facts to demonstrate jurisdiction”). In New York, personal jurisdiction may be based on general jurisdiction (see CPLR 301), or specific, or long-arm, jurisdiction (see CPLR 302).See Homeland Found., Inc. v Duke Univ., 2017 NY Slip Op 30462[U], *5 (Sup Ct, NY County 2017). As shall be set forth in detail and explained below, there is no material fact to contest that HYATT is not subject to the personal jurisdiction (general or specific) of this Court. HYATT IS NOT SUBJECT TO GENERAL IN PERSONAM IN NEW YORK To be subject to general jurisdiction under CPLR §301, a defendant corporation must either be incorporated in New York or have its principal place of business in New York. See Brocco v E. Metal Recycling Term. LLC, 211 AD3d 628 (1st Dept 2022) citing Daimler AG v Bauman, 571 US 117 (2014); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017). 6 of 14FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/26/2023 02:47 PM INDEX NO. 153070/2023NYSCEF DOC. NO. 16 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/26/2023 General jurisdiction exists over a corporate entity only in the state(s) in which it is incorporated and has its principal place of business. See Cruz v City of NY, 210 AD3d 523 (1st Dept 2022) citing Aybar v Aybar, 37 NY3d 274 (2021); Motorola v Std. Bank, 24 NY3d 149 (2014). HYATT was incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware 9 and maintains its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. HYATT is thus “at home” in Delaware or Illinois and general jurisdiction may be acquired over Hyatt in the courts located in those states. It is true that the Business Corporation Law requires foreign corporations seeking authorization to do business in New York to register with the New York Secretary of State and designate an in-state agent for service of process. However, in Aybar v Aybar, 37 NY3d 274 (2021) the Court of Appeals held that a foreign corporation does not consent to the exercise of general jurisdiction by New York courts by registering to do business here and designating a local agent for service of process. Therefore, it is of no moment that HYATT has designated an in-state agent for service of process in New York. As such, in light of the fact that HYATT is incorporated in Delaware and is headquartered in Illinois,10 HYATT is it not subject to general jurisdiction in New York. PLAINTIFF’S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS DO NOT SUPPORT THE EXERCISE OF SPECIFIC PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER HYATT It is well settled that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary (such as HYATT herein) [where] two requirements are satisfied: the action is permissible under the long-arm statute (CPLR 302) and the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. See 9 See, Exhibits “B” and “C” 10 See, Exhibits “D” and “E” and Urbanski Affidavit at ¶1-2 7 of 14FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/26/2023 02:47 PM INDEX NO. 153070/2023NYSCEF DOC. NO. 16 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/26/2023 City of Utica v Mallette, 200 AD3d 1614, (4th Dept 2021) citing Williams v Beemiller, Inc., 33 NY3d 523 (2019); LaMarca v Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 NY2d 210 (2000). Specific jurisdiction over a defendant is obtained through New York's long-arm statute, CPLR §302. See Fanelli v Latman, 202 AD3d 758 (2d Dept 2022). CPLR §302 provides, in relevant part, that New York courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary who transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state11 or commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state.12 See Qudsi v Larios, 173 AD3d 920 (2d Dept 2019). Specific Jurisdiction Does Not Exist under CPLR §302(a)(1) In order to determine whether specific jurisdiction exists under CPLR§ 302(a)(1), a court must decide (1) whether the defendant transacts any business in New York and, if so, (2) whether the cause of action arises from such a business transaction See Brocco v E. Metal Recycling Term. LLC, 211 AD3d 628 ([1st Dept 2022) citing Licci v Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F3d 50 (2d Cir 2012); Best Van Lines, Inc. v Walker, 490 F3d 239 (2d Cir 2007). There is a two-prong inquiry under CPLR§ 302(a)(1). See Piccoli v Cerra, Inc., 174 AD3d 754 (2d Dept 2019) citing Rushaid v Pictet & Cie, 28 NY3d 316 (2016); Santiago v Hwy. Frgt. Carriers, Inc., 153 AD3d 750 (2d Dept 2017). Under the first prong, the defendant must have conducted sufficient activities to have transacted business in the state, and under the second prong, the claims must arise from the transactions. See Rushaid v Pictet & Cie, 28 NY3d 316 (2016). A suit will be deemed to have arisen out of a party's activities in New York if there is an articulable nexus, or a substantial relationship, between the claim asserted and the actions that 11 CPLR 302(a)(1) 12 CPLR 302(a)(3) 8 of 14FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/26/2023 02:47 PM INDEX NO. 153070/2023NYSCEF DOC. NO. 16 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/26/2023 occurred in New York. See Best Van Lines, Inc. v Walker, 490 F3d 239 (2d Cir 2007) citing Henderson v INS, 157 F3d 106 (2d Cir 1998). Although causation is not required, there must be at minimum, a relatedness between the transaction and the legal claim such that the latter is not completely unmoored from the former. See Licci v Lebanese Can. Bank, SAL, 20 NY3d 327 (2012). In other words, jurisdiction will not be present where the relationship between the claim and transaction is too attenuated. See Matter of NY Asbestos Litig., 212 AD3d 584 (1st Dept 2023) citing Johnson v Ward, 4 NY3d 516 (2005). Any claim that HYATT owns and operate several hotels in New York should be seen for what it is, a red herring. It is irrelevant and has no bearing on the instant motion. Plaintiff’s accident did not occur in any alleged HYATT property or properties in New York. Plaintiff’s accident arises from alleged premises liability/negligence in Cancun, Mexico. Whether or not HYATT has any ownership interest in properties or a leasehold in New York does not subject HYATT to the personal jurisdiction of this court. It is therefore irrelevant and immaterial to granting HYATT’s motion to dismiss. As such, personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained pursuant to CPLR §302(a)(1) because there is an insufficient relationship between HYATT’s activities within New York and Plaintiff’s claims of alleged premises liability/negligence which occurred at a hotel that was neither owned operated, controlled nor managed by HATT or an agent thereof in Cancun, Mexico. See Quad Capital Portfolio A LLC v AbbVie Inc., 201 AD3d 449 (1st Dept 2022). Specific Jurisdiction Does Not Exist under CPLR §302(a)(3) CPLR §302(a)(3) provides for jurisdiction over a defendant who (1) commits a tortious act outside New York (2) that causes injury within New York (3) where the defendant either (i) does or solicits business, or engages in any other course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from 9 of 14FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/26/2023 02:47 PM INDEX NO. 153070/2023NYSCEF DOC. NO. 16 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/26/2023 activities in New York, or (ii) expects or should expect that its tortious act will have consequences in New York, and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce. See Magwitch, L.L.C. v puss*r's Inc., 84 AD3d 529 (1st Dept 2011) citing Cooperstein v Pan-Oceanic Mar., Inc., 124 AD2d 632 (2d Dept 1986). The determination of whether a tortious act committed outside New York causes injury inside the state is governed by the "situs-of-injury" test, requiring determination of the location of the original event that caused the injury. See Magwitch, L.L.C. v puss*r's Inc., 84 AD3d 529 ([1st Dept 2011) citing Bank Brussels Lambert v Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F3d 779 (2d Cir 1999); Kramer v Hotel Los Monteros S. A., 57 AD2d 756 (1st Dept 1977). Under CPLR §302(a)(3), the situs of the injury is the location of the original event which caused the injury, not the location where the resultant damages are subsequently felt by the plaintiff. See Fanelli v Latman, 202 AD3d 758 (2d Dept 2022) citing Hermann v Sharon Hosp., Inc., 135 AD2d 682 (2d Dept 1987); Paterno v Laser Spine Inst., 24 NY3d 370 (2014); McGowan v Smith, 52 NY2d 268 (1981). In Stern v Four Points by Sheraton Ann Arbor Hotel, 133 AD3d 514 (1st Dept 2015), the Plaintiff alleged that, while in New York, she reserved a room at the Sheraton Inn Ann Arbor in Ann Arbor, Michigan using an interactive website maintained by Starwood Hotels and Resorts Worldwide, Inc. for Sheraton hotels. During her stay at the Sheraton Inn hotel, which was then owned by defendant ZLC, plaintiff tripped over a walkway in the hotel lobby and fractured her knee. The Appellate Division, First Department held that long-arm jurisdiction could not be asserted under CPLR 302 (a) (3), which applies when a tortious act committed outside the state causes injury within the state, because plaintiff's injury occurred in Michigan. 10 of 14FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/26/2023 02:47 PM INDEX NO. 153070/2023NYSCEF DOC. NO. 16 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/26/2023 In the present case, Plaintiff’s [alleged] injury occurred in Cancun, Mexico. Therefore, just like in Stern, supra, cited above, long-arm jurisdiction cannot be exercised and/or asserted against HYATT under CPLR §302(a)(3). THERE IS ALREADY ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT THAT HYATT IS NOT SUBJECT TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN NEW YORK In the matter of Cara Herlihy v. Hyatt Corporation et al, (Supreme Court New York County Index No. 159385/2020) the Plaintiff commenced a lawsuit against HYATT, Carib Resorts Inc., and Blue Illusions Ltd. (“Blue Illusions”), as a result of personal injuries allegedly sustained at Blue Illusions Limited, Balmoral Island, P.O. Box N-4839 Nassau New Providence, The Commonwealth of the Bahamas. In dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint against HYATT on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, the Hon. Lynn Kotler, J.S.C. wrote the following: Hyatt is not subject to general in personam jurisdiction in New York for the reasons that follow. CPLR § 301 provides that "[a] court may exercise such jurisdiction over persons, property, or status as might have been exercised heretofore." Generally, New York Courts will exercise general in personam jurisdiction over a defendant: [1] present in the State of New York; [2] who consents to New York's jurisdiction; [3] domiciled in New York; or [4] doing business in New York. Further, New York's exercise of jurisdiction must satisfy the Due Process Clause of the US Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment (see International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310 [1945]). Hyatt is incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware and maintains its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. 13 Hyatt has further demonstrated that it is not subject to long-arm jurisdiction in New York. To determine whether a non-domiciliary may be sued in New York, the court must first determine whether New York's long-arm statute, CPLR § 302, confers jurisdiction over it in light of its contacts with New York (LaMarca v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 95 NY2d 210 [2000]). If any of the provisions of CPLR § 302 apply, then the court must determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process (id). The purpose of CPLR § 302 is to extend New York jurisdiction to nonresidents who have engaged in some purposeful activity in New York in 13 In accordance with 22 NYCRR §202.8-a(a), a copy/printout of the decision rendered by the Court in Herlihy v. Hyatt Corp et al, is annexed hereto as Exhibit “F” 11 of 14FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/26/2023 02:47 PM INDEX NO. 153070/2023NYSCEF DOC. NO. 16 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/26/2023 connection with the cause of action asserted (Parke-Bernet Galleries Inc. v. Franklyn, 26 NY2d 13 [1970]).14 Under CPLR 302 (a) (1), "a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non- domiciliary . . . who in person or through an agent . . . transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state." As defense counsel correctly points out, plaintiff has not proffered any evidence of activities by Hyatt in New York that resulted, or was related to the Plaintiff's slip and fall accident that occurred in the Bahamas (see i.e. Mejia-Haffner v. Killington, Ltd., 119 AD3d 912 [2d Dept 2014]). Accordingly, Hyatt's motion is granted in its entirety and plaintiff's complaint against Hyatt is severed and dismissed. 15 The facts herein are strikingly similar to those in Herlihy in that both cases involve a claim seeking damages for personal injuries which are alleged to have occurred at a HYATT property/resort outside the State of New York. As mentioned above, the Court in Herlihy determined that HYATT is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York Given that there is already established precedent that HYATT is not subject to personal jurisdiction in New York where an injury is alleged to have occurred at HYATT property outside New York. The same result should ensue in the present case. The Complaint should be dismissed as against HYATT on the grounds that HYATT is neither subject to general nor specific jurisdiction in New York. HYATT IS AN IMPROPER PARTY TO THIS ACTION Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit as a result of personal injuries allegedly sustained in a shower located in a guest room at the premises known as Secrets the Vine Cancun "Secrets" Resort, located at Boulevard Kukulcan KM, 14.5 Retorno De; Rey Lote, 38+38-b, 77500 Cancun, QR, Mexico. There is no genuine issue of material fact that on the date of loss, HYATT did not have any ownership interest or operational responsibility for The Vine. 16 Moreover, there is no genuine 14 Id. 15 Id. 16 See, Urbanski Affidavit at ¶6-7 12 of 14FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/26/2023 02:47 PM INDEX NO. 153070/2023NYSCEF DOC. NO. 16 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/26/2023 13 of 14FILED: NEW YORK COUNTY CLERK 04/26/2023 02:47 PM INDEX NO. 153070/2023NYSCEF DOC. NO. 16 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 04/26/2023 14 of 14

Related Contentin New York County

Case

ESTUPINAN, ELIZABETH v. WALLACK NYC FAMILY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP et al

Mar 28, 2022 |Latin, Hon. Richard |Tort-Other Negligence |Tort-Other Negligence |152563/2022

Case

Rafael Pena, Christina Diaz v. Balwinder Singh

Aug 20, 2024 |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |157623/2024

Case

April Gonzalez v. Chanson 23rd Street Llc

Aug 19, 2024 |Torts - Other (NYLL Wage Violations) |Torts - Other (NYLL Wage Violations) |157596/2024

Case

Wajid Shah v. The City Of New York

Aug 21, 2024 |Torts - Other (False Arrest) |Torts - Other (False Arrest) |157720/2024

Case

Derli Felix Lucas Cedeno v. 160 Riverside Boulevard Llc, 160 Riverside Corp., John Doe General Contractor

Aug 20, 2024 |Torts - Other (Labor Law) |Torts - Other (Labor Law) |157679/2024

Case

MCPHAIL, SARAH v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY et al

Case

EBANKS, EARL C v. AERCO INTERNATIONAL, INC et al

Apr 23, 2021 |Silvera, Hon. Adam |Tort-Asbestos |Tort-Asbestos |190095/2021

Case

Justin Brewer v. Manhattan And Bronx Surface Transit Operation Authority, New York City Transit Authority, Mta Bus Company, The Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Norman Louis Sneed

Aug 03, 2022 |James G. Clynes |Torts - Motor Vehicle |Torts - Motor Vehicle |451266/2023

Case

SINGH, SATPAL v. MTA BUS COMPANY et al

Apr 26, 2024 |Clynes, Hon. James G. |Tort-Motor Vehicle |Tort-Motor Vehicle |452265/2024

Ruling

ROSEVIANNEY C OGUMSI VS RICHARD DALE GENTILE, D.D.S., ET AL.

Aug 21, 2024 |22STCV13792

Case Number: 22STCV13792 Hearing Date: August 21, 2024 Dept: 3 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES - NORTHEAST DISTRICT ROSEVIANNEY C. OGUMSI, Plaintiff(s), vs. RICHARD DALE GENTILE, D.D.S., et al., Defendant(s). ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) CASE NO.: 22STCV13792 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT RICHARD DALE GENTILE, D.D.S.S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Dept. 3 8:30 a.m. August 21, 2024 I. INTRODUCTION Plaintiff Rosevianney C. Ogumsi (Plaintiff) filed this action on April 26, 2022. In the operative Second Amended Complaint (SAC), Plaintiff asserts claims against moving defendant Richard Dale Gentile, D.D.S. (Defendant) for professional negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent business practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (UCL), and defamation. On February 6, 2023, the Court sustained Defendants demurrer to Plaintiffs defamation claim. On May 31, 2024, Defendant filed this motion for summary judgment to address the four remaining causes of action asserted in the SAC. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs first cause of action for professional negligence fails because no act or omission was a substantial factor in causing or contributing to any injury or damage to Plaintiff, nor has Plaintiff suffered any damages as a result of any act or omission. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs second cause of action for IIED fails because Defendant did not engage in any extreme or outrageous conduct and Plaintiff did not suffer any damages. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs third cause of action for NIED fails because Plaintiff did not suffer any mental or emotional distress. Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fourth cause of action for violation of the UCL fails because he: (1) timely provided Plaintiff with her dental and medical records as requested, (2) did not commit fraud, and (3) did not commit any act or omission which caused Plaintiff to suffer any injury or damages. II. LEGAL STANDARD In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, courts must apply a three-step analysis: (1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponents claims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue. (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.) A defendant moving for summary judgment has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) To meet this burden of showing a cause of action cannot be established, a defendant must show not only that the plaintiff does not possess needed evidence but also that the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain needed evidence. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.) Once the defendant . . . has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) The plaintiff may not merely rely on allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material fact exists, but instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action. (Ibid.) If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted. (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) III. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS AND REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Defendant objects to Plaintiffs Declaration. The Court SUSTAINS the objections to the entire declaration on the grounds that it is unexecuted and therefore fails to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5. The Court further sustains Defendants objections to Paragraphs 10, 13, 18, 19, 29, 30, 31 through 34, 39, 40, 43 through 50 as inadmissible insofar as they contradict Plaintiffs deemed admissions. IV. DISCUSSION Defendant relies on Plaintiffs deemed admissions to argue that she has admitted that: (1) the INCIDENT did not cause [her] to suffer any injury, harm or damage and (2) [she] [has] not suffered any mental or emotional distress due to the INCIDENT. (Compendium of Exhibits, Exs. L; UMF Nos. 47, 49, 50.) The requests for admission were propounded by co-defendants Heydar Shahrokh and Heydar Shahrokh, D.D.S., Inc. dba Comfort Dental Center, and deemed admitted in a minute order dated September 25, 2023. (Exs. L, M, and N.) The requests for admission define the term INCIDENT as refer[ring] to the circ*mstances and events which caused the injuries and damages [Plaintiff] alleged in the Complaint. (Ex. L, p. 2.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot prove her medical malpractice claim because she is required to show that she sustained some loss or damage resulting from a medical profesionals breach of duty. (Latimore v. Dickey (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.) Plaintiff has admitted that she did not suffer any injury or harm from the circ*mstances and events alleged in her complaint. Therefore, Defendant meets his moving burden to show that Plaintiff cannot prevail on her medical malpractice claim. Similarly, Plaintiff is required to prove that she suffered mental or emotional distresss as an element of her IIED and NIED claims. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051 [identifying elements of IIED claim]; Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 928 [discussing NIED as claim to recover damages for emotional distress on a negligence claim].) Plaintiff has admitted, by judicial order, that she did not suffer any mental or emotional distress. Defendant thus shows that Plaintiff cannot prevail on her IIED and NIED claims. Last, a claim for unfair competition in violation of the UCL may only be brought by an individual who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair comptition. (Bus. and Prof. Code, § 17204.) Because Plaintiff admits she has suffered no injury or damages, Defendant meets his burden to show that she cannot establish her UCL claim. Plaintiff opposes the motion with an unexecuted declaration in which she describes the damage to her teeth and gums caused by Defendants provision of care. But the declaration is inadmissible for being procedurally defective. Also, Plaintiff did not move to withdraw the deemed admissions pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.300. Therefore, she is precluded from introducing any evidence which contradicts her deemed admissions since matters that are admitted or deemed admitted through RFA discovery devices are conclusively established in the litigation and are not subject to being contested through contrary evidence. [Citation.] (St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 775.) VI. CONCLUSION In light of the foregoing, the Motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Moving party to give notice. Dated this 21st day of August 2024 William A. Crowfoot Judge of the Superior Court Parties who intend to submit on this tentative must send an email to the Court at ALHDEPT3@lacourt.org indicating intention to submit on the tentative as directed by the instructions provided on the court website at www.lacourt.org. Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may nevertheless appear at the hearing and argue the matter. Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If the Court does not receive emails from the parties indicating submission on this tentative ruling and there are no appearances at the hearing, the Court may, at its discretion, adopt the tentative as the final order or place the motion off calendar.

Ruling

Aug 20, 2024 |23SMCV02751

Case Number: 23SMCV02751 Hearing Date: August 20, 2024 Dept: P The court will GRANT the application. The MSJ is CONTINUED to January 10, 2025, at 9:00 am, in Department P. Opposition and reply per code. This does not have the effect of continuing the trial or the discovery cut off dates. The court does not anticipate hearing arguments on the applications merits, but will hear from counsel as to whether there is a conflict on that date.

Ruling

PERKINS vs VALLEY WIDE TOWING LLC

Aug 22, 2024 |CVRI2305865

PERKINS VS VALLEY WIDECVRI2305865 MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATIONTOWING LLCTentative Ruling:The Court denies the motion for reconsideration.Procedural ContextFor purposes of this motion, however, Plaintiff is seeking the Court to reverse its prior rulingordering the consolidation of Plaintiff’s for injuries and damages from Defendant’s cross-complaintfor defamation.AnalysisA motion for reconsideration must be based on new or different facts, circ*mstances or law.(C.C.P. §1008(a).) The legislative intent was to restrict these motions to circ*mstances where aparty offers the court some fact or circ*mstance not previously considered, and some valid reasonfor not offering it earlier. (Gilberd v. AC Transit (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1500.) The burdenis comparable to that of a party seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence;that is, the information must be such that the moving party could not with reasonable diligencehave discovered or produced it at trial. (New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (2005) 135Cal.App.4th 206, 212-13.)In this matter, Counsel for Plaintiff in the underlying complaint has argued that the Court shouldreconsider its ruling, in part, because Counsel did not make an oral request for argument due tohis schedule. However, the Court did not base it ruling on whether or not Counsel madearrangements for oral argument, it based its ruling on the fact that all causes of action stemmedfrom the incident that occurred on December 10, 2021, including the defamatory statement aboutPlaintiff being shot that day. The Court recognizes that the social media posting occurredapproximately a year later, but there is no doubt that the circ*mstances of the incident are aboutthe exact same event.Indeed, the Court’s prior ruling was specifically made so as to avoid the danger of conflictingverdicts, which the Court finds would be significant if two different trials took place. For instance,suppose that Plaintiff’s underlying complaint went forward, and she was successful in obtaining averdict for the injuries she suffered. Suppose then as well the Court conducted a second trial,with a different jury, but instead that second jury came to the opposite verdict and concluded thatPlaintiff defamed Defendant about this shooting and that Defendant/Cross-Complainant wastherefore entitled to compensation. Which jury verdict should the Court rely upon when issuing ajudgment?This is the reason why the Court consolidated the two matters – to avoid inconsistent verdicts.Plaintiff has not provided any additional facts or arguments that has addressed this fundamentalissue, and thus, the Court finds no basis to reverse its decision to consolidate. The motion istherefore denied.

Ruling

VANESSA WILLIAMS VS JUANA LIZETH GARCIA APARICIO, ET AL.

Aug 21, 2024 |21STCV40967

Case Number: 21STCV40967 Hearing Date: August 21, 2024 Dept: 28 Having considered the documents submitted in support of the request for default judgment, the Court rules as follows. BACKGROUND On November 5, 2021, Plaintiff Vanessa Williams (Plaintiff) filed this action against Defendants Rapid Sameday Logistics, LLC (Rapid), Juana Lizeth Garcia Aparicio (Garcia), and Does 1-100 for motor vehicle tort and general negligence. On January 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed a proof of service showing personal service of the summons, complaint, statement of damages, and other documents on Rapids agent for service on January 4, 2024. On January 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a proof of service showing substituted service on Garcia of the summons, complaint, statement of damages, and other documents on January 7, 2024. On March 8, 2024, the clerk entered Rapids default and Garcias default. On July 16, 2024, the Court dismissed the Doe defendants without prejudice at Plaintiffs request. Also on July 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for Court judgment against Rapid and Garcia. PARTYS REQUEST Plaintiff Vanessa Williams asks the Court to enter a default judgment against Defendants Rapid Sameday Logistics, LLC, and Juana Lizeth Garcia Aparicio and award Plaintiff $608,987.92, consisting of $107,365.00 in special damages, $500,000.00 in general damages, and $1,622.92 in costs. LEGAL STANDARD A. Default judgment [With exceptions that do not apply here,] [a] party seeking a default judgment on declarations must use mandatory Request for Entry of Default (Application to Enter Default) (form CIV-100) . . . The following must be included in the documents filed with the clerk: (1) Except in unlawful detainer cases, a brief summary of the case identifying the parties and the nature of plaintiff's claim; (2) Declarations or other admissible evidence in support of the judgment requested; (3) Interest computations as necessary; (4) A memorandum of costs and disbursem*nts; (5) A declaration of nonmilitary status for each defendant against whom judgment is sought; (6) A proposed form of judgment; (7) A dismissal of all parties against whom judgment is not sought or an application for separate judgment against specified parties under Code of Civil Procedure section 579, supported by a showing of grounds for each judgment; (8) Exhibits as necessary; and (9) A request for attorney fees if allowed by statute or by the agreement of the parties. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1800(a).) B. Damages On a request for default judgment, [w]here a cause of action is stated in the complaint, plaintiff merely needs to introduce evidence establishing a prima facie case for damages. (L. Edmon & C. Karnow, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter 2023) ¶ 5:213.1, p. 5-56 (Cal. Practice Guide), citing Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361 [trial court erred in applying preponderance of the evidence standard].) The relief granted to a plaintiff upon entry of a defendant's default cannot exceed the amount demanded in the complaint or, for personal injury cases where damages may not be stated in the complaint, the amount listed in the statement of damages. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 580, subd. (a), 585, subd. (b).) The notice requirement of section 580 was designed to insure fundamental fairness. (Becker v. S.P.V. Construction Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 489, 494.) The statute insures that defendants in cases which involve a default judgment have adequate notice of the judgments that may be taken against them. [Citation.] If a judgment other than that which is demanded is taken against him, [the defendant] has been deprived of his day in courta right to a hearing on the matter adjudicated. (Id. at p. 493.) A trial court exceeds its jurisdiction if it awards damages in excess of the amount specified in the complaint or statement of damages. (Id. at p. 494.) DISCUSSION Plaintiff requests $95,000.00 in future medical expenses (as part of Plaintiff's request for $107,365.00 in special damages). But Plaintiff's declaration lists only $55,000.00 to $70,000.00 in future medical expenses. (See Williams declaration ¶ 13.) Plaintiff also asks the Court to award $500,000.00 in general damages. Plaintiff has not presented evidence supporting a general damages award of $500,000.00. Plaintiffs request for costs includes $245.00 for an appearance attorney. (Plaintiffs Default Judgment Brief p. 5.) This expense is not a recoverable cost under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a). Plaintiff also requests $250.00 in costs for copies, scanning, and postage. (Plaintiffs Default Judgment Brief p. 5.) Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (b)(2), [p]ostage, telephone, and photocopying charges are not allowable as costs except when expressly authorized by law. The Court denies the application for default judgment without prejudice. CONCLUSION The Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff Vanessa Williamss application for default judgment against Defendants Rapid Sameday Logistics, LLC, and Juana Lizeth Garcia Aparicio filed on July 16, 2024. Plaintiff is ordered to give notice of this ruling.

Ruling

Knox vs. Mohamud, et al.

Aug 22, 2024 |23CV-0202275

KNOX VS. MOHAMUD, ET AL.Case Number: 23CV-0202275Tentative Ruling on Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions: An Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions issued toPlaintiff Jamaal Knox and Counsel Beverly Law Firm for failing to appear at the trial setting conference on June17, 2024. The June 17, 2024 hearing date was set by the April 29, 2024 tentative ruling which became the finalorder of the Court. Counsel was present when the April 29, 2024 hearing was calendared. Despite being timelynoticed of the Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions, Plaintiff did not file a written response. Ther Court thereforeissues sanctions as against Plaintiff Jamaal Knox and Counsel Beverly Law Firm, in the amount of $250.00. Thismorning’s Review Hearing at 9:00 a.m. is confirmed.****************************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. – Review Hearings******************************************************************************************

Ruling

Janet Mlynar vs California Earthquake Authority, et al

Aug 19, 2024 |19CV03844

19CV03844MLYNAR v. CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE AUTHORITY et al PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER Plaintiff’s motion for a protective order is denied. “Where a party must resort to thecourts, ‘the burden is on the party seeking the protective order to show good cause for whateverorder is sought.’ [Citation.]” (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2016) 223Cal.App.4th 261, 318.) Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause for a protective order to haltthe deposition of David Bonowitz. I. BACKGROUND AND MOTION This case stems from the 2014 Napa earthquake. Plaintiff Janet Mlynar’s (“Mlynar”)home was insured for earthquake damage by CEA and CSAA. CEA issued a homeowner’spolicy to Mlynar thought its participating insurer, CSAA. After the earthquake, Mlynarsubmitted an earthquake claim under the CEA policy. Defendant Ronald Cook is an attorneyretained by CSAA to assist regarding the earthquake claim. The claim, for a variety of contestedreasons, was not resolved right away but instead there were numerous inspections regarding thescope and extent of the alleged damage to the home. Checks were issued to Mlynar but nevernegotiated by her, and again, the reasons why are in dispute. The claim also went through anappraisal process. In March 2023, defendant CEA subpoenaed certain documents of Mr. Bonowitz, astructural engineer who was previously hired by Mlynar in 2016; a copy of the subpoena wasserved on plaintiff’s counsel. Mr. Bonowitz produced the documents requested. Mlynar did notobject. (Dec. of Amato ¶ 3.) CEA then noticed his deposition, serving the notice on April 24,2024. Mlynar did not object. (Dec. of Amato at ¶ 5, Ex. 4.) The deposition began on May 10,2024, and lasted about an hour before Mr. Dobrin, Mlynar’s counsel, halted the deposition,stating Mlynar’s former counsel, Mr. Greenburg, may have intended Mr. Bonowitz to beconsidered a retained expert and that his [Mr. Bonowitz’s] prior work on the case was part ofconfidential settlement negotiations. He indicated his intention to move for a protective order.Mlynar filed this motion on July 18, 2024. Mlynar moves for a protective order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section2025.420, subd. (a)-(b), seeking an order that the deposition of Mr. Bonowitz, not take placeunless Mlynar discloses him as an expert witness for trial. Mlynar asserts a protective order is Page 1 of 6necessary to protect her from “unwarranted annoyance”, “oppression”, or “undue burden”. Shecontends Mr. Bonowitz was her expert consultant for the sole purpose of confidential settlementcommunications with CEA and CSAA. According to Mlynar, during the claim’s adjustmentprocess, the parties’ experts attempted to agree upon a “repair protocol” so that she could receiveCEA funds to start repairs on her home. The parties could not reach an agreement and proceededthrough the JAMS appraisal process. Mr. Dobrin attaches the following in support of Mlynar’s motion, along with requests forjudicial notice: • Exhibit A is an 11/22/16 email from Mr. Greenburg to defendant Cook which states “Confidential Settlement Communication” and enclosed Mr. Bonowitz’s schematic for removal of plaster walls at the property. • Exhibit B is a recent email chain concerning the deposition of Mr. Bonowitz. • Exhibit C is an email dated 9/26/17, with the subject line “Confidential Settlement Communication.” • Exhibit D are two emails dated 10/4/17 between defendant Cook and Greenburg with the subject line “Confidential Settlement Communication.” • Exhibit E is an email dated 8/8/18 from Mr. Greenburg to CSAA adjustor Vicki Miller with the subject line “Confidential Settlement Communication”, attaching Mlynar’s contractor/architect’s [Avelar] repair estimate and scope of work. • Exhibit F is a partial copy of the subpoena served on Mr. Bonowitz in 2023 by CEA. • Exhibit G is a letter dated 8/7/18 from Mr. Greenburg to CSAA. II. OPPOSITION BY CEA The opposition sets out four arguments: (1) Mr. Bonowitz was Mlynar’s engineeringconsultant during the presentation of the earthquake claim – not during the lawsuit and he wasnot retained in anticipation of the appraisal proceeding; (2) Mr. Bonowitz’s testimony is notrelated to a settlement offer or demand. He is expected to confirm his 2018 writing in which headvised Mlynar there was no structural damage to her property due to the earthquake; (3) theresults of Mr. Bonowitz’s destructive testing of the framing beneath the plaster walls at Mlynar’sproperty was intended to be shared with CSAA, which was adjusting the claim; and (4) to theextent there was an attorney-work product protection of Mr. Bonowitz’s testimony, Mlynarwaived such protections when her attorneys did not object to the production of his entire file inresponse to a subpoena. III. DISCUSSION Page 2 of 6 Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.420, subdivision (a) states, “[b]efore, during, orafter a deposition, any party, any deponent, or any other affected natural person or organizationmay promptly move for a protective order. The motion shall be accompanied by a meet andconfer declaration under Section 2016.040.” Subdivision (b) states, in part, “[t]he court, for goodcause shown, may make any order that justice requires to protect any party, deponent, or othernatural person or organization from unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression, orundue burden and expense.” California Evidence Code section 1152, Admissibility of Evidence subdivision (a) states,in part, that “[e]vidence that a person has, in compromise or from humanitarian motives,furnished or offered or promised to furnish money or any other thing, act, or service to anotherwho has sustained or will sustain or claims that he or she has sustained or will sustain loss ordamage, as well as any conduct or statements made in negotiation thereof, is inadmissible toprove his or her liability for the loss or damage or any part of it.” First, the emails referenced by Mlynar, though titled “Confidential SettlementCommunications” do not appear to include any specific offers to settle her claim. Second, CEApoints out that this section of the Evidence Code pertains to the admissibility of evidence, anddoes not reference limiting the scope of a deposition. Mlynar has not provided a basis for herassertion that Evidence Code section 1152 insulates the deposition testimony of a third-partywitness. Further, even assuming any protections existed for Mr. Bonowitz’s work and testimony,there have been multiple instances of waiver. “[T]he attorney work product privilege is subject tothe same waiver principles applied to the attorney-client privilege. ‘Waiver of work productprotection, though not expressly defined by statute, is generally found under the same set ofcirc*mstances as waiver of the attorney-client privilege—by failing to assert the protection, bytendering certain issues, and by conduct inconsistent with claiming the protection. Waiveralso occurs by an attorney's voluntary disclosure or consent to disclosure of the writing to aperson other than the client who has no interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the contentsof the writing.’[Citations.] Thus disclosure to a third party will waive the work product privilegeunless the disclosure was coerced.” (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2008)165 Cal. App. 4th 672, 678-679.) (Emphasis added.) In March 2023, CEA subpoenaed Mr. Bonowitz’s files related to his work at Mlynar’sproperty and a copy of the subpoena was served on her counsel. Mr. Bonowitz produced thedocuments requested. Mlynar did not object. (Dec. of Amato ¶ 3.) His deposition was noticed forApril 24, 2024, with all counsel, including Mlynar’s attorney, copied and again, Mlynar did notobject. (Dec. of Amato at ¶ 5, Ex. 4.) Finally, Mr. Bonowitz’s site visit notes were already Page 3 of 6disseminated as exhibits to a deposition of plaintiff’s contractor and as an exhibit to CEA’smotion for summary judgment. The motion is denied. The court declines to award sanctions. PLAINTIFF’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE FILED 7/18/24 1. Order on Motion for Summary Judgment in this case. Denied. The court need not take judicial notice of records in its own case file. 2. Declaration of Janet Mlynar in support of her Responses to Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts of Defendants CSAA Insurance Exchange and California Earthquake Authority in Support of their Motions for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication. Denied. The court need not take judicial notice of records in its own case file. 3. Declaration of Jon-Marc Dobrin in Support of Plaintiff’s Responses to Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts of Defendants CSAA Insurance Exchange and California Earthquake Authority in Support of their Motions for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication. Denied. The court need not take judicial notice of records in its own case file. 4. Plaintiff Janet Mlynar’s Response to Undisputed Material Facts of Defendants CSAA Insurance Exchange and California Earthquake Authority in Support of their Motions for Summary Judgment and/or Adjudication. Denied. The court need not take judicial notice of records in its own case file. PLAINTIFF JANET MLYNAR’S ADDENDUM TO REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE FILED 7/30/24 Ex. UU Redacted emails and report of defendants’ appraiser, Thad Eaton. Denied. PLAINTIFF JANET MLYNAR’S SECOND ADDENDUM REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE FILED 8/9/24 Ex. A copies of CSAA’s claim file produced in this action regarding CSAA’s redacted communications with its contractors Shaun Piazza and its engineer Peter Shandlin and the “Confidential Settlement Communication” from Mlynar’s attorney Greenburg with CSAA adjustor Vikki Miller. Denied.Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if the Page 4 of 6prevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed.

Ruling

Dana Sneed vs. KIRSTEN KORFHAGE

Aug 14, 2024 |C22-01974

C22-01974CASE NAME: DANA SNEED VS. KIRSTEN KORFHAGE*HEARING ON MOTION FOR DISCOVERY TO COMPEL THE DEPOSITION OF THE PERSON MOSTKNOWLEDGEABLE OF SUNRISE SENIOR LIVING MANAGEMENT, INC RE COMMUNITY PERFORMANCEAUDITSFILED BY: SNEED, DANA*TENTATIVE RULING:*The court was under the impression the moving party had requested these motions (Line 2 as well) bewithdrawn. On August 12, 2024, the opposing side informed the court that the matters should still beheard. The motions were vacated in the Case Management System and, if done erroneously, theywill be continued to September 25, 2024, when another motion is scheduled. The court wouldappreciate clarity from the parties in the future. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, CONTRA COSTA COUNTY MARTINEZ, CA DEPARTMENT 27 JUDICIAL OFFICER: TERRI MOCKLER HEARING DATE: 08/14/2024

Ruling

Moniz vs. Harnden, et al.

Aug 22, 2024 |23CV-0202881

MONIZ VS. HARNDEN, ET AL.Case Number: 23CV-0202881This matter is on calendar for a trial setting conference. The litigation is at issue. The Court designates this matteras a Plan II case and intends on setting the matter for trial no later than February 24, 2025. Neither party hasposted jury fees. The parties are granted 10 days leave to post jury fees. A failure to post jury fees in that timewill be deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to the hearingregarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.

Document

Anne B. Naramore v. Mount Sinai Health System, Inc., Andrew Kraatz, Kumar Chatani, John Does/Jane Does 1 Through 10

Mar 20, 2020 |Paul A. Goetz |Torts - Other (Sex Discrimination) |Torts - Other (Sex Discrimination) |152989/2020

Document

The City-Wide Council Of Presidents, At-Risk Community Services Inc., v. The New York City Housing Authority, Shola Olatoye, As Chair Of The New York City Housing Authority

Mar 01, 2018 |Carol R. Edmead |Torts - Other (Conversion) |Torts - Other (Conversion) |100283/2018

Document

Xiashu Meng v. New York City Transit Authority, Metropolitan Transportation Authority, The City Of New York

Jan 31, 2019 |Richard Tsai |Torts - Other Negligence (Slip and Fall) |Torts - Other Negligence (Slip and Fall) |151072/2019

Document

Jun 06, 2017 |Adam Silvera |Torts - Asbestos |Torts - Asbestos |190176/2017

Document

Jan 26, 2016 |Adam Silvera |Torts - Asbestos |Torts - Asbestos |190011/2016

Document

The City-Wide Council Of Presidents, At-Risk Community Services Inc., v. The New York City Housing Authority, Shola Olatoye, As Chair Of The New York City Housing Authority

Mar 01, 2018 |Carol R. Edmead |Torts - Other (Conversion) |Torts - Other (Conversion) |100283/2018

Document

Dec 17, 2013 |Gerald Lebovits |Asbestos |Asbestos |190350/2015

Document

George Alikakos v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Mta Construction And Development Company, Railworks Corporation, Tutor Perini Corporation, Railworks Transit, Inc

Jun 17, 2020 |Richard Tsai |Torts - Other (Premises Liability) |Torts - Other (Premises Liability) |154417/2020